A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the average voter. Why should the voting age be lowered at all, in the first place? Why should the new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or 20? And why not 17? Or even 16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the 21-year old, so that there is no need of an educational qualification to entitle him to vote? In this age of permissiveness and dissent, can the 18-year old be relied upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-year old, in the past elections, has not performed so well? If the proposed amendment is voted down by the people, will the Constitutional Convention insist on the said amendment? Why is there an unseemly haste on the part of the Constitutional Convention in having this particular proposed amendment ratified at this particular time? Do some of the members of the Convention have future political plans which they want to begin to subserve by the approval this year of this amendment? If this amendment is approved, does it thereby mean that the 18-year old should not also shoulder the moral and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old? Will he be required to compulsory military service under the colors? Will the contractual consent be reduced to 18 years? If I vote against the amendment, will I not be unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come 1973?
It should be duly acknowledged that the Court's task of discharging its duty and responsibility has been considerably lightened by the President's public manifestation of adherence to constitutional processes and of working within the proper constitutional framework as per his press conference of January 20,1973, wherein he stated that "(T)he Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution. It can and will probably determine the validity of this Constitution. I did not want to talk about this because actually there is a case pending before the Supreme Court. But suffice it to say that I recognize the power of the Supreme Court. With respect to appointments, the matter falls under a general provision which authorizes the Prime Minister to appoint additional members to the Supreme Court. Until the matter of the new Constitution is decided, I have no intention of utilizing that power."
The Constitutional Convention is co-ordinate and co-equal with, as well as independent of, the three grand departments of the Government, namely, the legislative, the executive and the judicial. As a fourth separate and distinct branch, to emphasize its independence, the Convention cannot be dictated to by either of the other three departments as to the content as well as the form of the Charter that it proposes. It enjoys the same immunity from interference or supervision by any of the aforesaid branches of the Government in its proceedings, including the printing of its own journals (Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 1952 ed., Vol. I, pp. 8 9; Malcolm and Laurel, Phil. Const. Law, p. 22; Frantz vs. Autry, 91 Pac. 193). Implicit in that independence, for the purpose of maintaining the same unimpaired and in order that its work will not be frustrated, the Convention has the power to fix the date for the plebiscite and to provide funds therefor. To deny the Convention such prerogative, would leave it at the tender mercy of both legislative and executive branches of the Government. An unsympathetic Congress would not be disposed to submit the proposed Constitution drafted by the Constitutional Convention to the people for ratification, much less appropriate the necessary funds therefor. That could have been the fate of the 1973 Constitution, because the same abolished the Senate by creating a unicameral National Assembly to be presided by a Prime Minister who wields both legislative and executive powers and is the actual Chief Executive, for the President contemplated in the new Constitution exercises primarily ceremonial prerogatives. The new Constitution likewise shortened abruptly the terms of the members of the present Congress (whose terms end on December 31, 1973, 1975 and 1977) which provides that the new Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification (Sec. 16, Article XVII, 1973 Constitution). The fact that Section 2 of the same Article XVIII secures to the members of Congress membership in the interim National Assembly as long as they opt to serve therein within thirty (30) days after the ratification of the proposed Constitution, affords them little comfort; because the convening of the interim National Assembly depends upon the incumbent President (under Sec. 3, Art. XVII, 1973 Constitution). Under the foregoing circumstances, the members of Congress, who were elected under the 1935 Constitution, would not be disposed to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor to enable the people to pass upon the 1973 Constitution, ratification of which means their elimination from the political scene. They will not provide the means for their own liquidation.
Chief Justice Stone of the United States Supreme Court likewise appears to subscribe to this view, when, in his concurring opinion in Duncan vs. Kahanamoku (327 U.S. 304 ), he defined martial law as "." (Emphasis supplied). There is an implied recognition in the aforesaid definition of martial law that even in places where the courts can function, such operation of the courts may be affected by martial law .... It is possible that the courts, in asserting their authority to pass upon questions which may adversely affect the conduct of the punitive campaign against rebels, secessionists, dissidents as well as subversives, martial law may restrict such judicial function until the danger to the security of the state and of the people shall have been decimated.
Distinguished counsel in L-36165 appears to have committed another historical error, which may be due to his rhetorical in the Encyclopedia Britannica (Vol. 9, 1969 ed., pp. 508-509) to this effect. On the contrary, Encyclopedia Britannica (Vol. 17 Encyclopedia Brit., 1966 & 1969 eds., 732-733), refers to Marshal Henri Philippe Petain as the genuine hero or "Savior of Verdun"; because he held Verdun against the 1916 offensive of the German army at the cost of 350,000 of his French soldiers, who were then demoralized and plotting mutiny. Certainly, the surviving members of the family of Marshal Petain would not relish the error. And neither would the members of the clan of Marshal Foch acknowledge the undeserved accolade, although Marshal Foch has a distinct place in history on his own merits. The foregoing clarification is offered in the interest of true scholarship and historical accuracy, so that the historians, researchers and students may not be led astray or be confused by esteemed counsel's eloquence and mastery of the spoken and written word as well as by his eminence as law professor, author of law books, political leader, and member of the newly integrated Philippine Bar.
The main responsibilities of an operations manager range from supervising the employees, to working with them to improve customer service (Job is Job).
All of us pass through the age of adolescence; not all of us takeup its ethical demands. The fact of our initial dependency has moralimplications, for it predisposes us to the temptations of bad faith,strategies by which we deny our existential freedom and our moralresponsibility. It sets our desire in the direction of a nostalgia forthose lost Halcyon days. Looking to return to the security of thatmetaphysically privileged time, some of us evade the responsibilitiesof freedom by choosing to remain children, that is, to submit to theauthority of others.
For their communication to be effective, each of them needs to put the responsibility for clear communication on himself (Healthcare Benchmarks & Quality Improvement 2009) which means that each of them should endeavour to send clear messages and to receive messages with as little distortion as possible...
Beauvoir’s argument for ethical freedom begins by noting afundamental fact of the human condition. We begin our lives aschildren who are dependent on others and embedded in a world alreadyendowed with meaning. We are born into the condition that Beauvoircalls the “serious world”. This is a world of ready madevalues and established authorities. This is a world where obedience isdemanded. For children, this world is neither alienating nor stiflingfor they are too young to assume the responsibilities of freedom. Aschildren who create imaginary worlds, we are in effect learning thelessons of freedom – that we are creators of the meaning and value ofthe world. Free to play, children develop their creative capacitiesand their meaning-making abilities without, however, being heldaccountable for the worlds they bring into being. Considering thesetwo dimensions of children’s lives, their imaginative freedom andtheir freedom from responsibility, Beauvoir determines that the childlives a metaphysically privileged existence. Children, she says,experience the joys but not the anxieties of freedom. Beauvoir also,however, describes children as mystified. By this she means that theybelieve that the foundations of the world are secure and that theirplace in the world is naturally given and unchangeable. Beauvoir marksadolescence as the end of this idyllic era. It is the time of moraldecision. Emerging into the world of adults, we are now called upon torenounce the serious world, to reject the mystification of childhoodand to take responsibility for our choices.
Moreover, what makes the premise of presumptive valid preferable and, even imperative, is that We are dealing here with a whole constitution that radically modifies or alters only the form of our government from presidential parliamentary but also other constitutionally institutions vitally affecting all levels of society. It is, to mind, unrealistic to insist on that, fundamentally, the 1973 Constitution is the same 1935 Constitution, with a few improvements. A cursory perusal of the former should convince anyone that it is in essence a new one. While it does retain republicanism as the basic governmental tenet, the institutional changes introduced thereby are rather radical and its social orientation is decidedly more socialistic, just as its nationalistic features are somewhat different in certain respects. One cannot but note that the change embraces practically every part of the old charter, from its preamble down to its amending and effectivity clauses, involving as they do the statement of general principles, the citizenship and suffrage qualifications, the articles on the form of government, the judiciary provisions, the spelling out of the duties and responsibilities not only of citizens but also of officers of the government and the provisions on the national economy as well as the patrimony of the nation, not to mention the distinctive features of the general provisions. What is more, the transitory provisions notably depart from traditional and orthodox views in that, in general, the powers of government during the interim period are more or less concentrated in the President, to the extent that the continuation or discontinuance of what is now practically a one-man-rule, is even left to his discretion. Notably, the express ratification of all proclamations, orders, decrees and acts previously issued or done by the President, obviously meant to encompass those issued during martial law, is a commitment to the concept of martial law powers being implemented by President Marcos, in defiance of traditional views and prevailing jurisprudence, to the effect that the Executive's power of legislation during a regime of martial law is all inclusive and is not limited to the matters demanded by military necessity. In other words, the new constitution unlike any other constitution countenances the institution by the executive of reforms which normally is the exclusive attribute of the legislature.
This essay will discuss two predominant communication skills- feedback and questioning- that are of particular importance to the human resource (HR) management profession.