The intent of this account, in which what gets shared is, we mightsay, an identity that the friends have in common, is not to bedescriptively accurate of particular friendships; it is rather toprovide a kind of ideal that actual friendships at best onlyapproximate. Such a strong notion of sharing is reminiscent of theunion view of (primarily erotic) love, according to which loveconsists in the formation of some significant kind of union, a“we” (see the entry on , the section on ). Like the union view of love, this account of friendship raisesworries about autonomy. Thus, it seems as though Sherman’sAristotle does away with any clear distinction between the interestsand even agency of the two friends, thereby undermining the kind ofindependence and freedom of self-development that characterizesautonomy. If autonomy is a part of the individual’s good, thenSherman’s Aristotle might be forced to conclude that friendshipis to this extent bad; the conclusion might be, therefore, that weought to reject this strong conception of the intimacy offriendship.
The point is that the friends “share” a conception ofvalues not merely in that there is significant overlap between thevalues of the one friend and those of the other, and not merely inthat this overlap is maintained through the influence that the friendshave on each other. Rather, the values are shared in the sense thatthey are most fundamentally their values, at which theyjointly arrive by deliberating together.
It is a bit unclear what your role is in being thus directed andinterpreted by your friend. Is it a matter of merely passivelyaccepting the direction and interpretation? This is suggested byCocking & Kennett’s understanding of friendship in terms ofa receptivity to being drawn by your friend and by theirapparent understanding of this receptivity in dispositional terms. Yetthis would seem to be a matter of ceding your autonomy to your friend,and that is surely not what they intend. Rather, it seems, we are atleast selective in the ways in which we allow our friends to directand interpret us, and we can resist other directions andinterpretations. However, this raises the question of why we allow anysuch direction and interpretation. One answer would be because werecognize the independent value of the interests of our friends, orthat we recognize the truth of their interpretations of us. But thiswould not explain the role of friendship in such direction andinterpretation, for we might just as easily accept such direction andinterpretation from a mentor or possibly even a stranger. Thisshortcoming might push us to understanding our receptivity todirection and interpretation not in dispositional terms but rather innormative terms: other things being equal, we ought to acceptdirection and interpretation from our friends precisely because theyare our friends. And this might push us to a still stronger conceptionof intimacy, of the sharing of values, in terms of which we canunderstand why friendship grounds these norms.
Second, and more important, Sherman’s Aristotle understands thesingleness of mind that friends have in terms of shared processes ofdeliberation. Thus, as she summarizes a passage in Aristotle(1170b11–12):
Brink (1999) criticizes Whiting’s account of friendship as tooimpersonal because it fails to understand the relationship offriendship itself to be intrinsically valuable. (For similarcriticisms, see Jeske 1997.) In part, the complaint is the same asthat which Friedman (1989) offered against any conception offriendship that bases that friendship on appraisals of thefriend’s properties (cf. the 3rd paragraph of above): such a conception of friendship subordinates our concern forthe friend to our concern for the values, thereby neglecting whatmakes friendship a distinctively personal relationship. GivenWhiting’s understanding of the sense in which friends sharevalues in terms of their appeal to the intrinsic and impersonal worthof those values, it seems that she cannot make much of the rebuttal toFriedman offered above: that I can subordinate my concern for certainvalues to my concern for my friend, thereby changing my values in partout of concern for my friend. Nonetheless, Brink’s criticismgoes deeper:
My personal definition of "friendship" is a feeling or emotion expressed in such a way that another feels wanted and important, a relationship between a person or persons where everyone has some companion to talk to when their in need of one....
Friendships are important to young children but there is a change at the beginning of adolescence -- a move to intimacy that includes the development of a more exclusive focus, a willingness to talk about oneself and to share problems and advi...
This novel is a tool that Mark Twain, whose real name was Samuel Langhorne Clemmons, was using to impress the great benefits of friendship upon society.
There is an apparent tension here between the idea that friendshipessentially involves being concerned for your friend for his sake andthe idea of pleasure and utility friendships: how can you be concernedfor him for his sake if you do that only because of the pleasure orutility you get out of it? If you benefit your friend because,ultimately, of the benefits you receive, it would seem that you do notproperly love your friend for his sake, and so your relationship isnot fully one of friendship after all. So it looks like pleasure andutility friendships are at best deficient modes of friendship; bycontrast, virtue friendships, because they are motivated by theexcellences of your friend’s character, are genuine,non-deficient friendships. For this reason, most contemporaryaccounts, by focusing their attention on the non-deficient forms offriendship, ignore pleasure and utility friendships.
Tuesday, Aug 13, 2013 11: 45 AM EDT The politics of being friends with white people My best friend at 9 was white but interracial. books are my friends essay example
A necessary condition of friendship, according to just about everyview (Telfer 1970–71; Annas 1988, 1977; Annis 1987; Badhwar1987; Millgram 1987; Sherman 1987; Thomas 1987, 1989, 1993; Friedman1993, 1989; Whiting 1991; Hoffman 1997; Cocking & Kennett 1998;and White 1999a, 1999b, 2001) is that the friends each care about theother, and do so for her sake; in effect, this is to say that thefriends must each love the other. Although many accounts of friendshipdo not analyze such mutual caring any further, among those that dothere is considerable variability as to how we should understand thekind of caring involved in friendship. Nonetheless, there iswidespread agreement that caring about someone for his sake involvesboth sympathy and action on the friend’s behalf. That is,friends must be moved by what happens to their friends to feel theappropriate emotions: joy in their friends’ successes,frustration and disappointment in their friends’ failures (asopposed to disappointment in the friends themselves), etc. Moreover,in part as an expression of their caring for each other, friends mustnormally be disposed to promote the other’s good for her sakeand not out of any ulterior motive. (However, see Velleman 1999 for adissenting view.)
To care about something is generally to find it worthwhile or valuablein some way; caring about one’s friend is no exception. Acentral difference among the various accounts of mutual caring is theway in which these accounts understand the kind of evaluation implicittherein. Most accounts understand that evaluation to be a matter ofappraisal: we care about our friends at least in part because of thegood qualities of their characters that we discover them to have(Annas 1977; Sherman 1987; Whiting 1991); this is in line with theunderstanding of love as philia or eros given in thefirst paragraph of Section 1 above. Other accounts, however,understand caring as in part a matter of bestowing value on yourbeloved: in caring about a friend, we thereby project a kind ofintrinsic value onto him; this is in line with the understanding oflove as agape given above.
Books are my friends essay example Browse Essays By Theme. E this feature to browse through the tens of thousands of essays that have been submitted to This I Believe. Lect a theme to see a listing.